# The Fastnet Disaster, 30 years later....



## Jeff_H (Feb 26, 2000)

In the past year or so, as the 30th Anniversary of the 1979 Fastnet disaster has been approaching, I find myself thinking about its impact on all of our lives as sailors. I am not the only one. I have included an exerpt from a blog by John Rousmaniere, who wrote the book 'Fastnet Force 10'. His blog included this quote, _"Why didn't you call your book Fastnet, Force 12?" my new friend half-asked, half-demanded. "Maybe it was blowing a mere Force 10 where YOU were, but not where I was."_

I think that it would be hard to understate the changes that have swept through our sport since that fateful race. There is hardly a single aspect of our sailing lives that has not been altered since 1979, even for those who sail boats from 1979 or before. Many of these changes are simply the result of new technologies not necessarily directly linked to the marine industry, but emerging from advances in other fields, and shifts in the political landscape, and social norms. But many, if not most of these changes are the direct or indirect result of the heightened awareness of sailing safety the emerged after 1979. It was as if us sailors all had been lulled into a false sense of security that was shattered in a single race. 

In March of that year, I was on a 41 foot IOR boat that death rolled out in the Atlantic. There were several desparate minutes trying to right the boat as she lay on her topsides; downflooding through open hatches, and then as the spin sheets were blown and the preventer eased allowing the boom to cross to leeward, the boat righted herself. We bore off, and trimmed the sails, flicked on the bilge pump to drain the mildly flooded cabin, and sailed off to complete the race. As I looked at the faces of the crew there was no sign of relief or fear at what had happened. Instead, there were comraderly laughter through big toothy grins, and the only concern was if that hurt us with the competition. 

This occurred before the Fastnet Disaster. Later that summer a number of the crew were standing around after a race and someone said, "Did you guys hear about that race in England?" This was the days before the internet, and sailing news typically came months later in one of the sailing magazines of the era, so all we knew at that point came from brief new coverage and the grapevine. 

But one of the guys in the discussion had been up to Bunky Helfred's yard on Hilton Head, where Tenacious was sent to be rebuilt after the Fastnet and had all the juicy details. By then he had heard the essense of Olin Stephen's quote, _"Some modern ocean racers, and the cruising boats derived from them, and dangerous to their crews,"_

As we sat there talking someone brought up that knock down and the dozens of death rolls and knock downs that we had all experienced in the race boats of that era. Up to then we figured this was normal for fast boats carrying a racing sail inventory. But as we talked there was a sense to that conversation that the yacht racing and the yacht design world as we knew it was about to change. 

In the years since, safety and deck hardware has progressed, storm tactics has become a debated and improved upon thought process, how we equip our boats has changed dramatically, motion comfort, hull and rig structure, ultimate and dynamic stability have been studied tremendously and the type of boats that are produced have responded dramatically. 

Race boats of that era were brutal to sail and the race boat technology that made these boats so hard to sail trickled into the coastal cruisers that were common to that era. Today, performance not withstanding, the advances that came out of all of that research has produced modern race boats that are easier and safer to sail with smaller crews. Race boats will always push the envelope and in doing so will move the needle on the "Safety-o-meter" very close to the "are you f-ing kidding me" end of the scale. But even so, we as sailors owe a debt of gratitude to those sailors whose lives were tragically cut short 30 years ago, but whose tragic loss lead to an industry wide rethinking of what a sailboat should be. 

Respectfully,
Jeff

*John Rousmaniere on the Fastnet 30 years later (exerpt):* 
_"The Fastnet, our destination, is a ship-shaped lighthouse perched on a rock. It's the outer turning mark in the odd-year 600-mile race that's been run since 1925 from southern England to near Ireland and back again. Rarely easy, the race, with 303 boats, was hit in 1979 by a surprising, shockingly strong and unstable westerly blow, with gusts in the 60s and shifting constantly, and waves 30 feet and higher. _

_"Boomerang, the 64-footer, and Toscana, my ride, came out of it with minimal damage. Not so lucky were the 100 or so boats that capsized or nearly so, the 24 boats that were abandoned, the five that sank, and the 15 sailors who died - all this in a sport whose total fatalities, until 1979, could be counted on two hands. For us in Toscana, the outlines of the calamity began to take shape on radio broadcasts as we ran home from the rock. Our navigator, John Coote, stuck his head up the companionway, paused for a few moments, and mournfully intoned words that I had never expected to hear when I first went to sea: "Men are dying out here." _

_"We did not feel the full thrust of the tragedy until after we finished at Plymouth, when Toscana approached a wharf crowded with silent, solemn women and men staring blankly out toward the Channel. On shore, I was approached by a man with an arm in a sling. Peter Johnson had sailed his boat and suffered the arm injury and broken ribs during three wild knockdowns, and now he was asking me to write a book about the race for his publishing house. The race was hard, but writing about it was harder. The seaman's chores and the roll of the vessel are welcome distractions at sea, but on shore all is still, and the uneasiness planted by the sight of those people on the wharf grew with every interview with a survivor. _

_"Back to hard facts, a proper question to ask is, "What's the larger importance of the Fastnet storm?" My answer is that this is the watershed event in the long history of pleasure sailing, dating back almost 200 years. I don't know of any other incident that has been both so catastrophic and so constructive in our sport - or, for that matter, in any sport. _

_"The post-race review conducted by the Royal Yachting Association and the Royal Ocean Racing Club gathered more solid information about the behavior of boats and sailors in extreme weather than had ever existed through generations of anecdotes and cruise narratives. Building on this enormous data base, the boating industry and several non-profit organizations came up with the Lifesling, new rescue techniques, better safety harnesses, and other valuable innovations. Towing-tank tests of boat stability, heavy-weather steering, and storm tactics were run by the U.S Yacht Racing Union (now the U.S. Sailing Association), the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, and the Wolfson Unit in England. The Cruising Club of America produced a manual on offshore design and gear, Desirable and Undesirable Characteristics of Offshore Yachts, with chapters by Olin and Rod Stephens, Jim McCurdy, Bill Lapworth, Tom Young, and other leading sailors and designers of that era. When Olin wrote, "Some modern ocean racers, and the cruising boats derived from them, and dangerous to their crews," people paid attention, and rating rules were improved. _

_"Regulations and gear can't solve every problem, which is why one of the most important developments in the wake of the 1979 Fastnet was that large numbers of sailors finally began to talk about safety - until then the elephant in the yacht club - at safety at sea seminars and other forums. Talking leads inevitably to stories, stories attract people's attention, and so, as long as there are veterans of that wild August night telling those stories, lessons will be learned. "_ 
__________________


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## Valiente (Jun 16, 2006)

A very good retrospective, Jeff. I would say that while on the design front the lessons of Fastnet have "trickled down" to the realm of the recreational sailor, giving us boats that are fast, fun and yet intrinsically safer than those of the early '80s, say, there are still tendencies in racing to make boats that are simply too weak to compete in the contests for which they are designed to race. The America's Cup and the Vendee Globe, with their appalling attrition rates, come to mind.

While I can understand the rationales involved, in the case of Southern Ocean sail races, I think the Australian, New Zealand and Chilean navies are going to (justifiably, I think) start to charge for rescues from broken boats that shaved too much carbon off in the quest for that extra hundredth of a knot of speed.

Another criticism, I think, is that just as the installation of airbags hasn't improved driving skills, but merely allowed poor drivers to persist in being poor drivers, the older boats made more prudent sailors, because their touchy, easily "irritated" IOR designs would kill them if they weren't skilled. Today's boats allow less experienced sailors to do more without killing them. While this is undoubtedly better for the sailors, I'm not convinced it's better for the sport.


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## smackdaddy (Aug 13, 2008)

Awesome write up Jeff. Thanks.

That's still one of the best books I've ever read. And I appreciate the perspective you've added in how boat design was affected thereafter - for both racers and cruisers.

Great stuff. Especially for those of us looking for our next boats.


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## mccary (Feb 24, 2002)

Thanks Jeff, that is a well written retrospective of a defining moment in our sport. I am old enough to recall reading about that race and seeing the Washington Post front page first person article. Just that short report had a profound effect on my sailing. At that time I owned and sailed a 1977 22' Seafarer. From that point on I had a new respect for the wind and power of the sea, even though I sail in the relatively protected waters of The Chesapeake Bay. I read countless articles and books on heavy weather sailing. I have never experienced anything like the 79 Fasnet but its effect is never far from my cautionary mind.


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## johnshasteen (Aug 9, 2002)

Great write up Jeff. I bought Rousmaniere's book when it first came out and realized how dangerous racing boats and bay boats of the day were if caught in a blow. Knowing that most of my sailing is offshore and it was only a matter of time before I would be caught in a Gulf storm, because of the excellent reporting of the disaster in his book that, when it came time to move to a bigger boat, I spent the extra $$ and bought a, go anywhere in any weather, Bristol.


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## Jeff_H (Feb 26, 2000)

John: There is a tendancy to think of the IOR as being monlithic when it was a series of rules really. What is interesting about your post is that the Bristol 29.9 was a first generation IOR boat designed to replace the earlier Bristol 30 which was designed to the MORC rule. Although not as extreme as later IOR boats it did have the pinched stern, and small mainsail, big jib rig proportions and many of the handling flukes of the early IOR rule beaters. Of course the IOR boats of the late 1970's were far more extreme. 

Jeff


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## johnshasteen (Aug 9, 2002)

Jeff_H said:


> John: There is a tendancy to think of the IOR as being monlithic when it was a series of rules really. What is interesting about your post is that the Bristol 29.9 was a first generation IOR boat designed to replace the earlier Bristol 30 which was designed to the MORC rule. Although not as extreme as later IOR boats it did have the pinched stern, and small mainsail, big jib rig proportions and many of the handling flukes of the early IOR rule beaters. Of course the IOR boats of the late 1970's were far more extreme.
> Jeff


Hi Jeff, I understand that. My point was that in Rousmaniere's Fastnet Force 10 book, one of his comments was that a lot of the boats out there were not designed for heavy weather. And, although I had been through a monster storm in the Atlantic in the late summer/early fall of 1960 aboard my dad's Hickley B40, laying for Bermuda, I had given little thought to the possibility of getting caught in any big storms in the Gulf. But, after reading his book several times and giving it some serious thought, and it being time to move up, I decided to look for a reasonably fast (not a racer, but also not a Westsail 28) bluewater boat, and the Bristol 29.9 fits the bill quite nicely. Yes, it has the slightly pinched stern and smaller sail plan, but I liked the strength that Herreshoff designed into the boat: From the Almag 35 aluminum port lights (there's were too many boats out there back then with plastic port lights), overlapping hull-to-deck joints, glassed and through-bolted every three inches to the cutaway forefoot, encapsulated lead ballast keel and skeg-hung rudder of the underbody (no bolted-on, fin keel, spade rudders allowed) 
And has she met the test? Paloma's sloughed through more bad weather at sea than 98% of the boats on this site. She has held up admirably through two Force 10 storms deep in the Gulf and a half-dozen named storms in ports along the Texas coast over these many intervening years and, after all these years, she's still my little bluewater warrior princess.


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## johnsail (Apr 4, 2000)

*Fastnet, etc*

From John Rousmaniere: Thanks, Jeff and the others, for your kind words about my book FASTNET, FORCE 10 and my piece that ran in Scuttlebutt on Friday, kicking off other Fastnet stories. A crucially important advance triggered by the disaster is that a conversation like this is occurring. Anybody who's been to a safety at sea seminar (and I strongly encourage it for all who are even half-serious about sailing) knows how bad things can get out there and how important it is to hear about what worked and what didn't. (Schedules of upcoming safety seminars are run on the US Sailing website: http://offshore.ussailing.org/SAS.htm).

Two things should be noted about the '79 Fastnet. First, a great many vessels in that 303-boat fleet were small, with a number of 30-footers. Almost all the boats that got into very serious trouble would not have qualified for a Newport-Bermuda Race, where the minimum size is about 38 feet.

Second, as my story from a Swan 47 and others from even larger boats all show, every entry was severely challenged. This was an horrific storm -- no normal summer gale or Gulf Stream blow but something like a winter storm. The barometer saw its third lowest reading for a 20th century August.

Still, it must be said that IOR design as it had developed by the late 1970s was not compatible with even normal strong winds. Many of these boats were dinghies in shape, high performance, and lack of stability. Some had a stability range of about 100 degrees, meaning that once they heeled that far, they kept on going until they capsized and even turtled - obviously not a desirable characteristic! Today 115-120 degrees is the rule for a boat heading offshore.

Keep up the conversation! John Rousmaniere


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## Valiente (Jun 16, 2006)

And you keep writing, John...you're one of the few as handy with a pen as a halyard!


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## Jeff_H (Feb 26, 2000)

No, Thank you John for all that you have done to help publicize and present these important issues.

Jeff


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## smackdaddy (Aug 13, 2008)

Wow, John...it's great to have you here on SN. I had no idea!

FNF10 is definitely one of the best. Great work.

Another similar book I'm looking for is the "1994 Pacific Storm Survey" by Kim Taylor. Can't seem to find it here in the US (only via NZ). But from what I understand, it's a very thorough comparison of more modern boats in insanely bad conditions, all using various HW techniques.

Have you read it?


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## GaryHLucas (Mar 24, 2008)

I remember the reports about that race. What came out of it most for me though is "The best way to enter a life raft is to step UP into it." Lots of lives were lost in that race, yet only 3? boats actually sunk. Many abandoned boats were found later, their crew having drowned trying to get in or stay in a life raft. It appears that panic was a major factor.

Since then I've always said I wanted to own a boat with seat belts down below. If things get really bad I want to strap in and wish for my mommy, and let the boat take care of herself.

My Etap 26 seems like a step in the right direction, as it has 100% foam flotation. So staying on board is the first priority. Short lanyards, and hefty pad eye right in the cockpit sole help with that.

Gary H. Lucas


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## gtod25 (Aug 5, 2000)

*Here is an example of one on the boats.....*

that followed the race.










A tri called "Bucks Fizz". Four people lost from her (If memory serves). That's me standing on the hull looking up, on body recovery duty two days after the storm. Photo taken form the Irish Naval vessel L.E. Deirdre.


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## smackdaddy (Aug 13, 2008)

Wow - gtod...God bless you man. I continue to be amazed at the people on this site.

Your signature quote suddenly means a lot more. And I love it that you are still at that sea.


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## johnsail (Apr 4, 2000)

Thanks. I don't know that one, but there are others that you may be familiar with others that tease out lessons learned to one degree or another. Tony Farrington's fine book on the great 1994 Queen's Birthday Storm, RESCUE IN THE PACIFIC, is one. Another is Rob Mundle's FATAL STORM (now with an introduction by me) on the 1998 Sydney-Hobart. Victor Shane's DRAG DEVICE DATA BASE is a collection of instructional storm stories. And there's Steve Dashew's very good DEFENSIVE SEAMANSHIP. -- John R.



smackdaddy said:


> Wow, John...it's great to have you here on SN. I had no idea!
> 
> FNF10 is definitely one of the best. Great work.
> 
> ...


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## Markangelo (May 27, 2012)

My father, Cyril J Breza, drowned on the relatively protected waters of the Chesapeake Bay
the day after the Fastnet Race. Yes the storm kept going & whipped across the Atlantic
& showed up quickly on that calm summer day. Because the draft of the bay is shallow
wind waves can churn up immensely. Sail Safe Mates !


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## souljour2000 (Jul 8, 2008)

Thank you MarkAngelo for reviving this thread that I did not even know existed...and seems to have somehow gotten lost in the mix as it is very,very, short thus far...compared to many threads in here, and especially considering how fundamental to Sailnet and sailing the topic of this thread is...
Afterall, this is of course a discussion of arguably the seminal event in sailing of at least the last 50 years or more...."the '79 Fastnet"....and it's not just the almost inconcievable deaths of 15 brave sailors...but the death of the IOR rules...and it's boats...and yet it could be argued that it was simply a truly freak storm...a Force 12...the third lowest barometric reading in the N Atlantic in a century....no matter how many boats (303 is alot btw), and how small many were (many of the lost were 30-ish in length), it seems to me IMHO that the over-arching armchair analytic theme should be more like or along the lines of..."How to survive in 30-footers in a storm of the century"...It was afterall, seemingly to me , and my HO again, primarily, and in essence, a simply hellacious meteorological event...especially when it occurred within the matrix of the sea and a 300+ sailboat race fleet....And that it indeed revealed the inherent flaws of many IOR boats...but to me this race revealed more about safety measures a crew should follow in a Force 12 than anything about the inherent sea-keeping abilties of IOR boats...though I agree they had serious flaws...to me the conversation should be really always be about staying with or hangin onto the boat and getting inside her at the right time and not allowing water ingress into the cabin..and waiting it out...either with a drogue system or just sloshing about...pounded to a pulp...puking and praying...but strapped in...inside the boat....and especially if your in a 30-ish IOR boat.that's how I see this whole thing...but I've never read the report and likely never will...Take it for what it is...and from a guy who has no real blue-water experience...but before you post just put it in your pipe and smoke it for a minute...think about it...and if I am full of crap I hope I am ready to give a vigorous debate and rebuttal...but respectfully, I thought Jeff's 2009 summary was not what the story of what this ill-fated race was about at all...

for example:

"In the years since, safety and deck hardware has progressed, storm tactics has become a debated and improved upon thought process, how we equip our boats has changed dramatically, motion comfort, hull and rig structure, ultimate and dynamic stability have been studied tremendously and the type of boats that are produced have responded dramatically". 

okay.. I am not trying to pick on jeff for something he wrote Three years ago...well...yes I am...but Jeff does take alot of heat as is natural..and he does a great job whether you agree with him or not...and he can stand the heat in the kitchen ..but well..here we go...

Okay...well safety and hardware has progressed...safety more than hardware though.. Not with the Chinese SS crap they make today...Not IMHO....And storm tactics?..The Kiwis or Aussies (I forget which, forgive me) designed a $2,000 (USD) drogue system yes...but the trend has really been about speed and tech...and that speed and weather tech info via your own onboard systems or related via a team onshore will get you out of the "bad" corner of the storm. Otherwise there's a trend more or less reverted back to what the old-school sailors did...get their ass back into the cabin, bar the companionway hatch and any other hatch and strap into a bunk like a Caterpillar who wants to be a butterfly some day ...and hang onto your ass...under bare poles....
Motion comfort though? Ultimate and dynamic stabiltiy?? ...Maybe in 15 knots but not in 115 kts...and has the response really been that good by designers and builders...? Maybe at first there was some safe boats...'80 or '81 ...Cherubini and/or Bob Perry come to mind....but not since Bruce Farr came on the scene...or whoever came up with low freeboard fat ass artillery shell-shaped boats, with another lead artillery shell of a keel ...this time of lead...hung 10 feet below... that surf rather than sail...pound like mad...but yeah..are faster than the speed of light...the speed of light...hmm...and oh yeah...and there's one other piece of wisdom that seems over-riding from the committee....don't be in a late 70's IOR boat....! I can't argue that one really...

God rest the soul's of the Fastnet '79....and don't forget that "the more that things change the more they stay the same"....You won't catch me in one of these new-fangled twin-rudder condo-crates....just sayin'....

Now you's goes to seas in what you's want to goes to seas in though...and hopefully... there's to be some semblance of a respectful, healthy debate from the gallery....


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## puddinlegs (Jul 5, 2006)

souljour2000 said:


> Okay...well safety and hardware has progressed...safety more than hardware though...and storm tactics? Not with the Chinese SS crap they make today...Not IMHO....they have designed a $1500.00 drogue system yes...but the trend has more or less reverted back to what the old-school sailors did...get their ass back into the cabin, bar the companionway hatch and any other hatch and strap into a bunk like a Caterpillar who wants to be a butterfly some day ...and hang onto your ass...under bare poles....Motion comfort though? Ultimate and dynamic stabiltiy...maybe in 15 knots but not in 115 kts...and has the response really been that good by designers and builders...? Not since Bruce Farr came on the scene...or whoever came up with low freeboard fat ass artillery shell-shaped boats that surf rather than sail...pound like mad...but yeah..are faster than the speed of light...the speed of light...hmm...and oh yeah...and don't be in a late 70's IOR boat....and God rest the soul's of the Fastnet '79....and don't forget that "the more that things change the more they stay the same"....You won't catch me in one of these new-fangled twin-rudder condo-crates....just sayin'....
> 
> Now hopefully... there's to be some semblance of a respectful, healthy debate from the gallery....


Where's the "don't like" button? This thread isn't about debate, it's about reflections and lessons learned. Start a new thread and 'debate', then we can talk about what you don't know about Bruce Farr in the appropriate place.


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## souljour2000 (Jul 8, 2008)

Please say something or go start your own thread...if you just wanted to say you don't like what i said..you said it...no need to search for a button...i'd rather you would have more to say my friend...but if that's it...please move on...but I'd rather you said something...or presented something...other than what you were able to...afterall, most decent rebuttals involve either very succinct sentences..or if not quite so snappy then at least more than two sentences...now come back and defend Bruce Farr or what have you...


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## PCP (Dec 1, 2004)

souljour2000 said:


> ...
> 
> Afterall, this is of course a discussion of arguably the seminal event in sailing of at least the last 50 years or more...."the '79 Fastnet"....and it's not just the almost inconcievable deaths of 15 brave sailors...but the death of the IOR rules...and it's boats........And that it indeed revealed the inherent flaws of many IOR boats......
> 
> ...


Do you mean that today Farr designed performance boats are not much better and safer than 30 years old performance boats, namely IOR boats? If you think that you are obviously wrong.

Not only designers learned how to make faster and more seaworthy boats as the ORC rules were modified to demand that boats comply with much more demanding criteria than the one that was needed for the 1979 race namely rules that have to do with minimum stability criteria.

Farr is just one of the best naval architects from the last half of the XX century and one that continues to sit among the best. Saying that he makes unseaworthy boats or have contributed to a trend that resulted in unseaworthy boats is just &#8230;.well, I prefer to say that it do not makes any sense.

Regards

Paulo


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## souljour2000 (Jul 8, 2008)

Look..I am not trying to disregard the original idea of the thread...the 30-years since Fast net...but it's 2012...well..maybe you have a point puddinlegs...I don't want to stomp on this thread if someone thinks I am...it is an old thread..but it's very brief considering the subject, and it never really got going for whatever reason..so you know I changed my mind...and I'm going to stay on it...because I think that it needs re-visiting in the context of the original...I guess I am afraid that no lessons were ever really learned in terms of the safety of the boats themselves...I guess I am curious what we have learned about the design of boats themselves that is so much more seaworthy than the IOR boats of 1979 fastnet? Beacuse looking at the boats of today...I don't see any better sea-handling qualities when it's blowing Force 12...do you? Can someone elucidate upon this..or is it just that we havent had another weather-set like Fastnet...we've had Vendee-globes and Sydney -Hobart disasters to exemplify the rigorous-race performance of post fastnet style boats in more than harsh conditions...but I wonder how they would really compare to "Force 12 "1979-style or even force-10.......I just think or fear somehow that we really havent learned enough from fastnet is all I am saying...in terms of actual boat design and performance in conditions like that..the rest of the debate as regards safety training and other safegaurds being more peripheral though of perhaps no less importance....


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## puddinlegs (Jul 5, 2006)

I think Paulo summed it up quite well as to what you don't understand or know about Bruce Farr. His boats and designs have been sailed safely millions of sea miles. I'd ask you souljour to be more specific in your critique of his work. Or perhaps you could tell us about why and how Bill Lee, Carl Schumaker, George Olson, John Spencer, Bill Lapworth, or similar yacht designs have been inherently unsafe. Conversely, you haven't told us which designs, etc... are inherently 'safer'. As for the IOR rule, not all boats of that era are the same by any means, and again, there are many old IOR war wagons that have been converted and successfully and safely cruised and raced for years after the demise of their design brief. The truly poor and extreme 'rule beater' have long ago been scrapped or sitting in yards withering away.

You could also point out that it's important that while for most of us, being warm, dry and comfortable are tantamount to safety, yet boats like the Open 30, 40, mini 6.5 classes have logged many many miles safely in conditions that most of us go well out of our way to avoid.

Fastnet and Sydney Hobart. It's arguable that it wasn't the wind that killed anyone, but the exceptional sea state (both) and cold water temps (Fastnet). Yes, that a Dick Carter designed One Tonner was lost doesn't come as a large surprise, nor does the fact that Ted Turner's S&S designed boat along with the vast skill set of he and his crew, did survive. Here it's critical to mention the vast changes that weather forecasting/information have become available and usable to the public along with the profound changes in how we communicate. Do I want to or would I be willing to sail something like a 'Flying Tiger' in 60 kts? Absolutely not. On the other hand, If I were to be caught out in bad conditions in something like a Farr 11.20, I couldn't think of that many boats that would be much safer. I have great confidence the boat is much tougher than I am. Are there any boats that wouldn't be terrifying in 115kts? Maybe an aircraft carrier or 'Missouri' class battleship, but no pleasure craft I can think of.

So in the meantime souljour, I'll respectfully disagree with your shotgun blast premise that all boats of a particular era or type are inherently dangerous or poor and that we haven't learned anything. And again regarding your critique of Bruce Farr in particular, I'll settle for the Farr boats I've sailed on and the records of people like Sir Peter Blake, and many many others.


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## souljour2000 (Jul 8, 2008)

Ted Turner was in a 61-footer apparently when I went back and researched abit...i had been under the impression "tenacious" was closer to 38-feet but i'm not sure where i had gotten that...if someone can set the record straight would appreciate...but I just threw farr's name out there because to me it's synonomous with the newer flatter wide-assed boats..but maybe the Pogo and whoever made those but it wasn't necessarily an indictment of Farr...he just comes to mind because of Jeff H...Hi Jeff...I'm back at it again...lol... Anyways, I just wanted to be a bit of a curmudgeon and rake the muck as I am wont to do...but also because I still dont think that the design tendencies for todays boats incorporate the ability to take a bad roll after knock down and get back up...they flip now worse than ever...even more so than the what the IOR boats brought to the table in terms of righting themselves....They are flat...so how can they right themselves if flipped over....other than they have crown in the coachroofs.. but what if that lead bullet keel on a stick has snapped off and is gone? What then...the boat is a skipping stone and the crew is going to be incapacitated quickly from the staggering g-forces...unless strapped in like astronauts...hope the pumps are working...who is going to be able to operate a manual one...I dunno...just sayin...Open 60's, pogo 40's...I know the Pogo's are ancient now..not a good example maybe...I'm obviously not up on all the new boats..the new classes don't really interest me....wish they did...but now we are getting wings and winglets on boats...This is all fine for close offshore races...but I hope to God we dont get more Hobart 1999 or Fastnets god forbid... I worry the big offshore body-count since designers started trying to re-invent the wheel is just going to continue to pile up...sincerely hope to hell I am wrong...but these folks are risk-takers so...you take your chances..
But safety first...and whatabout the cruisers who are buying these boats...? But as mentioned... no one ever said offshore sailing was safer than your morning ride to work..though arguably it is.....but few would say that it is...and I know that if some of these folks werent going way offshore in flat boats that go fast...they'd find something else to get the adrenaline up...people can do as they please...but just don't expect the CG or Navies of the world to save them...it's not fair to ask them to...it's dangerous and the rescue/military services are broke and all for what...a race.. well......let the rich guys of these races form their own sea rescue teams with helos and cutters...all I am saying...or go to sea in boats that have a better chance of keeping the crew alive...when it's alot rougher than the forecast...(fastnet '79 was forecast for Force 6 initially if I recall...the weather intel is better now but they still get it wrong alot...always will) i'm not trying to piss alot of folks off here...just making some points...don't want a pissing contest with anyone...we can agree or agree to disagree...These forums are a place I use to think things out..I'll never meet most of ya'...but I'd prefer to be able to air out things in a respectful format so while I am curmudgeonly and muck-raking..I still lay it out with tongue in cheek so just a disclaimer for any who might take all this too personally...please try not to..


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## PCP (Dec 1, 2004)

souljour2000 said:


> ...but I just threw farr's name out there because to me it's synonomous with the newer flatter wide-assed boats..but maybe the Pogo and whoever made those but it wasn't necessarily an indictment of Farr...he just comes to mind because of Jeff H.....but also because I still dont think that the design tendencies for todays boats incorporate the ability to take a bad roll after knock down and get back up...*they flip now worse than ever...even more so than the what the IOR boats brought to the table in terms of righting themselves....They are flat...so how can they right themselves if flipped over.*...other than they have crown in the coachroofs.. ...
> * I worry the big offshore body-count since designers started trying to re-invent the wheel is just going to continue to pile up*........we can agree or agree to disagree.......


Regarding the designer of Pogo that you now chose to give as an example of a designer that have contributed to the design of unsafe offshore boats, it is even a worse example than Farr. Finot is, along with Farr one of the living greatest NA, as it is probably the guy that contributed more to make racing offshore boats safer. Open 60 are probably the safer 60ft around and many of the rule alterations that permitted that to happen (related with safety) were suggested or proposed by him to the class rulers.

Saying that a modern racer is less stiff and more prone to flip than an old IOR racer or less capable of righting itself up only reveals that you don't know what you are talking about. This is not a matter of opinion or personal taste.

Off course, all IOR boats are not the same but taken as a whole that rule was changed justly because the boats that produced tended to be not very stiff. The change of that rule happened after the Fastnet disaster and the objective of that change was to create a rule that as a tendency would produce safer offshore boats and that was obviously accomplished.

Yes, we can and should agree to disagree in what regards personal choices and tastes but not in what regards facts

Stating as you say that modern ocean racers are less safe than 30 year old ocean racers (* I worry the big offshore body-count since designers started trying to re-invent the wheel is just going to continue to pile up*) is just nonsense and not a matter of personal opinion.

Regards

Paulo


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## Roger Long (May 28, 2012)

My favorite quote from "Fastnet Force 10" is this one:

Bill Burrows, Chief Engineer Royal Navy Lifeboat Institution, who retrieved three disable sailboats in a 21 hour rescue said:



> ... Look, you get 300 Yachts in poor weather and you're going to have some trouble, almost certainly. But the majority of the trouble was hysteria created by the situation and by inexperienced crews.
> 
> Yes, I know they were racing sailors, not cruising men, but that's no excuse. We went out that night and we passed a little old hooker sort of thing with a family of kids aboard and they were going away to Ireland with no trouble at all....


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## smurphny (Feb 20, 2009)

Two things I internalize from the discussion and what has been learned from Fastnet and similar disasters are: 1. Stay on the boat 2. Own a boat with a low capsize ratio that can be battened down and eventually will right itself. When I see pictures of sailors standing atop the wrong side up, waiting to be rescued, it makes me wonder why any one would put to sea in such a contraption.


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## PCP (Dec 1, 2004)

smurphny said:


> Two things I internalize from the discussion and what has been learned from Fastnet and similar disasters are: 1. Stay on the boat 2. Own a boat with a low capsize ratio that can be battened down and eventually will right itself. When I see pictures of sailors standing atop the wrong side up, waiting to be rescued, it makes me wonder why any one would put to sea in such a contraption.


I understand what you mean but a capsize ratio, as have been explained many times is only a useful toll to access the capacity of a boat to right itself in what regards some type of old boats and completely inadequate to access that capacity on a modern boat. Regarding that you should be taking about a an adequate AVS (or LPS as some prefer to call it), a relatively high one. That works for any type of boat.

Both things are important but as important as those two things is the ability of the boat not to be capsized in first place (static and dynamic stability). I am sure you will not like to be in a boat that is very easy to right itself up but that is also very easy to turn turtle.

Regards

Paulo


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## smurphny (Feb 20, 2009)

PCP said:


> I understand what you mean but a capsize ratio, as have been explained many times is only a useful toll to access the capacity of a boat to right itself in what regards some type of old boats and completely inadequate to access that capacity on a modern boat. Regarding that you should be taking about a an adequate AVS (or LPS as some prefer to call it), a relatively high one. That works for any type of boat.
> 
> Both things are important but as important as those two things is the ability of the boat not to be capsized in first place (static and dynamic stability). I am sure you will not like to be in a boat that is very easy to right itself up but that is also very easy to turn turtle.
> 
> ...


Will have to look up the newer AVS rating formula. The only comparative data I've seen on my old A35 are calculated by the "capsize ratio" formula. It's the one I saw when considering different boats to restore and the only one I'm familiar with to compare relative safety of cruising boats. Do you have a good link to an AVS explanation?

Case in point: If you have never seen it, the circumnavigation of Jean de Sud by Yves Gelinas, includes his being rolled in the 40s, losing mast, jury rigging pieces of the mast and sailing on. It's a video sent out with the promo material for Cape Horn windvanes and demonstrates the survivability of a well designed boat in the worst conditions.


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## souljour2000 (Jul 8, 2008)

PCP said:


> Regarding the designer of Pogo that you now chose to give as an example of a designer that have contributed to the design of unsafe offshore boats, it is even a worse example than Farr. Finot is, along with Farr one of the living greatest NA, as it is probably the guy that contributed more to make racing offshore boats safer. Open 60 are probably the safer 60ft around and many of the rule alterations that permitted that to happen (related with safety) were suggested or proposed by him to the class rulers.
> 
> Saying that a modern racer is less stiff and more prone to flip than an old IOR racer or less capable of righting itself up only reveals that you don't know what you are talking about. This is not a matter of opinion or personal taste.
> 
> ...


 I dunno...Is it un-informed of me to want to rather fall off the ripcurl of a 30-foot wave in an old IOR boat or ..... a Pogo 40...? Well, call me uninformed all day but I'll choose to take the plunge in the worst of the old IOR boats....before I'd try out the pogo 40....but if I had my druthers I'd rather be on the other posters A-35 or my Columbia 40. Now as regards 99 percent of conditions...the Pogo 40 is going to be faster, sail flatter and though a rougher ride..it is not going to get knocked down as easy as the IOR boat due to it's beam "overhang" lets call it...form stability is something else in my book but okay we can call it that too...but when it's time to take the Nestea "pitch-pole" plunge....well...I'll be on the IOR boat if that's my two choices...just sayin... Now does that mean I am saying the Pogo 40 is less safe?...No....it's ability to escape to the storm's weak side due to it's speed is something to consider...it;s just when stuff starts breaking off that newer boats they worry me...stuff can break off IOR boats and as long as the hatches are watertight...the boat may be on its back but the thing is floating...I am not so sure about the new boats...how does a wave eventually flip them back over and self-right when the whole keel stem and bulb are 5000 feet down laying next to a dinner plate off the HMS Titanic? Well, it has at least re-joined the dinner plate...just not the right one...


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## Dean101 (Apr 26, 2011)

PCP said:


> I understand what you mean but a capsize ratio, as have been explained many times is only a useful toll to access the capacity of a boat to right itself in what regards some type of old boats and completely inadequate to access that capacity on a modern boat. Regarding that you should be taking about a an adequate AVS (or LPS as some prefer to call it), a relatively high one. That works for any type of boat.
> 
> Both things are important but as important as those two things is the ability of the boat not to be capsized in first place (static and dynamic stability). I am sure you will not like to be in a boat that is very easy to right itself up but that is also very easy to turn turtle.
> 
> ...


It is not my intention to change the subject but I'm not familiar with AVS or LPS. Almost every boat I've looked at lists a capsize ratio and yet I've seen it mentioned in several threads that it is misleading or not a realistic representation of a boats ability to right itself. Could you explain or at least point me in an appropriate direction to learn what AVS or LPS is? I would definitely like to learn a sound and realistic method of determining a boats ability to resist capsize.

Thanks.


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## PCP (Dec 1, 2004)

smurphny said:


> Will have to look up the newer AVS rating formula. The only comparative data I've seen on my old A35 are calculated by the "capsize ratio" formula. It's the one I saw when considering different boats to restore and the only one I'm familiar with to compare relative safety of cruising boats. Do you have a good link to an AVS explanation?


For finding a boat AVS you need to know all the data boat included not only the ballast but also and mostly the boat CG. In practice if you are not the boat designer and have all data available the errors can be huge, in the order of 15º so I would not try that.

Regarding a new boat for certifying it on EC a designer calculated boat AVS (and much more stability) data is needed so you have them available on the builder that has the certification papers.

On the RYA site you have plenty of boat stability data and many boat AVS as a form of providing relevant information to the public.

Regarding an older boat that had not its AVS calculated by the NA (and that's a bad sign) or that is unknown to the owner, the only reliable form is to calculate it using an inclining experiment. That is the way that is mandatory for the ORC certification. You can have all the needed information from them but I would say that is easier to pay to someone that is used to do that for having more reliable results. You can find people with that knowledge in all clubs that do some serious racing

Regards

Paulo


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## smurphny (Feb 20, 2009)

Dean101 said:


> It is not my intention to change the subject but I'm not familiar with AVS or LPS. Almost every boat I've looked at lists a capsize ratio and yet I've seen it mentioned in several threads that it is misleading or not a realistic representation of a boats ability to right itself. Could you explain or at least point me in an appropriate direction to learn what AVS or LPS is? I would definitely like to learn a sound and realistic method of determining a boats ability to resist capsize.
> 
> Thanks.


I too am pretty much in the dark as to the physics and math of these formulas but I think the criticism of the "capsize ratio" formula, which is pretty simple, is that it does not account for the center of gravity of the boat. It doesn't take into account the position of the ballast, whether down low or up high. It seems the "angle of vanishing stability" formula does a better job at that. Don't want to divert the OP but hope some of the more mathematically inclined here can clarify.


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## souljour2000 (Jul 8, 2008)

I don't know either Dean...someone will be able to explain it I'm sure..I just use sailcalcpro and whatever formula that is for capsize resistance...but I take it all with a grain of salt...


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## PCP (Dec 1, 2004)

smurphny said:


> I too am pretty much in the dark as to the physics and math of these formulas but I think the criticism of the "capsize ratio" formula, which is pretty simple, is that it does not account for the center of gravity of the boat. It doesn't take into account the position of the ballast, whether down low or up high. It seems the "angle of vanishing stability" formula does a better job at that. Don't want to divert the OP but hope some of the more mathematically inclined here can clarify.


Yes you are right. Here you can find a good explanation of a method that is used for empirically give an approximated result. However since CG is not considered it will not work with modern boats, I mean boat that have a big draft and all the ballast on a bulb. Even worse if they have it in a torpedo. This method works only considering the B/D ratio and even so is an improvement to the old capsizing ratio formula.

Of course to have the same righting effect, a boat that has all ballast distributed on a 1.6m keel, will need a much bigger B/D ratio than a boat that has a 2.5m draft and all the ballast on a torpedo. For considering that formula on modern boats you have to consider the boat has having much more ballast than it has in reality. You have to consider a multiplier factor for the ballast. On a full keel with a short draft even comparing with a Fin keel boat with no bulb on most cases you should consider a divider factor, since for the same ballast the CG would be higher.

www

Has I have said, the only reliable way is taking fully into account the boat CG. Not knowing that the best is an inclining experiment.

Regards

Paulo


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## Night_Sailor (May 27, 2012)

John is an interesting guy and writes a good book. 

Regarding the IOR rule. I have an old IOR boat and penalizing boats for having a big rudder is insane.


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## Dean101 (Apr 26, 2011)

This discussion of safety and seaworthiness has been great in that it does provoke me to think about those things. I have not done an in-depth study of the Fastnet race but the discussions I've read on the subject make it apparent to me that there are many more factors than just boat design that lent themselves to the tragedy. Experience, location, tactics, physical tolerance to the elements, they all have their place in that event and appear to have as much relevance IMHO as boat design. 

I appreciate the fact that new modern boats are engineered to do what they are intended to do. Just as in the construction industry, I'm also relatively sure that some builders are more meticulous about building to specs than others. I also agree to the conclusion that the safety and seaworthiness of any boat is determined by its whole and not just any one of its parts such as hull form, sail plan, size, or displacement. Sure, all those things add or subtract from the whole but no single one of them define the boats abilities to the exlusion of the others.

I definitely appreciate the fact that classes are readily available to teach virtually any aspect of sailing. There is a huge range of safety, communications, and monitoring equipment available now for almost any application. The internet has provided the means for sailors around the globe, both experienced and not, to share experience and knowledge through forums such as this. 

Has all this happenned since 1979? Was it all the result of that fateful race? I can't say. I can say that I want to take away something on a personal level from events such as this that will help prepare me to be a better sailor, to be more prepared, and to make better decisions. With all that in mind, let me pose this question.

What have you as individuals learned from the Fastnet tragedy and similar events since? How have you applied that knowledge to your own sailing experience?


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## PCP (Dec 1, 2004)

Dean101 said:


> It is not my intention to change the subject but I'm not familiar with AVS or LPS. Almost every boat I've looked at lists a capsize ratio and yet I've seen it mentioned in several threads that it is misleading or not a realistic representation of a boats ability to right itself. Could you explain or at least point me in an appropriate direction to learn what AVS or LPS is? I would definitely like to learn a sound and realistic method of determining a boats ability to resist capsize.
> 
> Thanks.


Sorry, did not saw your post.

Here is the answer about LPS






Regarding determining a *"sound and realistic method of determining a boats ability to resist capsize"* that is a very complex issue with not an easy answer.

We can determine the energy needed to capsize the boat and that would be equivalent to the area under the positive part of a righting moment stability curve:

http://www.btinternet.com/~keith.bater/stability.pdf

But dynamic stability and the way boats have or have not the ability to dissipate the energy impact of a wave on any other movement than a rotational one is paramount to resist a capsize and sometimes more important than the energy needed to capsize the boat.

The AVS is just the first indicator that people look when they talk about boat stability and it is important but providing it is an acceptable one no more than other factors like for instance the righting moment a boat is making to right itself up at 80 or 90º of heel (if a boat takes too long to right itself up will be exposed laying down to the next wave that certainly will capsize it).

Narrow older full keelers tend to have a higher AVS than some modern boats but a lower righting moment at 80º or 90º. Each case is a case and if there are some older boats with great stability criteria there are others that are rather bad.

Regarding new boats the quality in what regards minimum stability is more uniform. They have all to pass over minimum stability criteria to be EC approved.

Even so there are significant difference between different boats and in some cases, like for instance centerboarders, having an average static stability does not mean that they are not very seaworthy, like for instance the French aluminium voyage boats. Some boats hull shapes and types of keels work better dynamically in what regards stability and waves then others.

Complicated is the word to evaluate boat stability, however I would say that the ones that design boats today are very good and if they design a voyage boat or a boat mostly pointed to offshore sailing you can be sure that it is a safe boat.

I would trust more on the knowledge of those guys that in any simplistic formula. Off course you can learn about that but it will take a lot of time and effort. No easy answer.

Regards

Paulo


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## smurphny (Feb 20, 2009)

One boat I have always admired (and almost bought) is the P-40. It has a retractable centerboard with the ballast relatively high compared to Pearson's older full keel designs. I have always questioned the relative safety of these types designs. The shallow draft is a BIG asset but I wonder about the overall safety for offshore cruising. It's too bad no one has plugged these older boats into improved safety formulas.


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## MarkSF (Feb 21, 2011)

I've read a few books on the Fastnet disaster and other racing disasters, and the main thing I took away is that the greatest difference in survivability, given a reasonably sound boat design, lies in the tactics used to survive a storm. Active techniques are better than passive, but they require certain equipment - storm jib, trisail, effective sea anchor. Close reaching, heaving to, and running with a sea anchor can all be effective but lying-a-hull has proven to be not so good.


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## smurphny (Feb 20, 2009)

MarkSF said:


> I've read a few books on the Fastnet disaster and other racing disasters, and the main thing I took away is that the greatest difference in survivability, given a reasonably sound boat design, lies in the tactics used to survive a storm. Active techniques are better than passive, but they require certain equipment - storm jib, trisail, effective sea anchor. Close reaching, heaving to, and running with a sea anchor can all be effective but lying-a-hull has proven to be not so good.


An A35 lay ahull during the Fastnet, crew played cards below and waited out the storm.


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## puddinlegs (Jul 5, 2006)

souljour2000 said:


> *I am not so sure about the new boats*...how does a wave eventually flip them back over and self-right when the whole keel stem and bulb are 5000 feet down laying next to a dinner plate off the HMS Titanic? Well, it has at least re-joined the dinner plate...just not the right one...


Exactly. Don't confuse 'opinion' with 'fact'. People are not dying willy nilly in yacht racing because of unsafe boats. The numbers just don't support your supposition. The whole 'keels falling off' is largely a non-starter. Again, many many many sea miles have been sailed on boats with bulbs on a high aspect fin. This by and large doesn't effect the vast majority of production boats. There are indeed particular manufactures that have had quality control problems, and some race boats at the bleeding edge of technology have lost keels. Like anything else, all builders are NOT equal. And to answer your rhetorical question, yes, when the bulb is at the bottom, the boat doesn't self-right.


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## Dean101 (Apr 26, 2011)

@ Paulo - Thanks for telling me what AVS and LPS is. I've actually heard and read a little about them but seeing them abreviated didn't register for some crazy reason. My bad on that one! You are right about the complexity of stability and I won't even begin to pretend that I understand much of it.

@ Roger Long - Thanks for that link. I will be reading it more thoroughly when I have more time.

I read all sorts of opinions as to whether or not certain boats are safe or appropriate for offshore use. I'm currently saving for my next boat and it will most likely be an older boat since I'm on a budget. As I mentioned earlier, capsize ratios are available for almost every boat I've looked at but I have been considering that ratio as only being generally indicative of a boats seaworthiness. I haven't been able to locate any resource that actually shows stability curves for older boats whose manufacturers have gone out of business. With stability being such an important factor and that factor cited in cases such as the Wingnuts capsize which resulted in deaths I would think that stability information would be much more readily available. Any person making a decision to take any given boat offshore would definitely have a vested interest in such information.


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