# Cheeki-Rafiki: Another Shoe Falls



## Jeff_H

An article in the Guardian says that a jury has been presented evidence that the Cheeki Rafiki sailors died after company boss cut corners.

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/08/cheeki-rafiki-sailors-died-after-company-boss-cut-corners-jury-hears

According to the artuicle:
"Four British sailors died at sea after a yachting company director cut costs and failed to have their "unsafe and broken" vessel checked by safety inspectors, a jury has heard.

"Douglas Innes allegedly told the inexperienced crew to take a potentially dangerous route across the Atlantic from Antigua to the UK to save time, even though the yacht was not authorized to be more than 60 miles from shore if it was not accompanied by other vessels.

"When the yacht, Cheeki Rafiki, began taking on water the crew emailed Innes, who was in a pub in the UK, but instead of alerting the coast guard he carried on drinking and even went to another bar, it is claimed."


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## Don L

so as to all the long drawn out production boat construction threads and arguments, it came down to you can't crash stuff (ground it) and expect there to be no damage, you need to inspect it


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## capta

Was this not a professional delivery crew? Don't they have some responsibility in this? Setting sail across an ocean on an apparently unseaworthy craft? 
Ever since the Fantome incident it seems that owners have become the scapegoats for what should primarily be the crew's responsibility. 
It seems to me their deep pockets make them an easy target for those seeking to assuage their grief with money.


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## smackdaddy

Wow. Innes is definitely in deep on this one.

And, though it probably doesn't surprise anyone, I obviously agree with Don. CR has never been a good example in these debates of anything other than the factual findings above.


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## Don L

capta said:


> Was this not a professional delivery crew? Don't they have some responsibility in this? Setting sail across an ocean on an apparently unseaworthy craft?


Just asking, but how was the professional crew suppose to know about the issue ahead of time? Though I do wonder why if they had communication to the owner that they didn't call the coast guard themselves.


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## Jeff_H

There is nothing normal about the Cheeky Rafiki story. This was not your average production boat, your average delivery or average delivery crew. 

The Beneteau 40.7's were serious racer-cruisers with a real emphasis on racer rather than cruisers. They were more tightly engineered than most production boats, and went through way higher quality controls than most production or even semi-custom boats. 

Cheeky Rafiki had a hard life. She was raced very hard including in some very tough conditions. She had made multiple trans Atlantic passages. She had an exceptional number of groundings including several that were termed hard groundings. If I remember correctly, she had some damage noted and thought to have been repaired in a manner inconsistent with the surveyor recommendations. And given the location of the damage, in the unlikely case that the delivery crew might have seen those repairs, they would not have any way to know whether they were done properly. 

And lastly what ever else you think about production boats, 40.7s were designed to be able to do offshore races and passages, but my belief is that they were never intended to routinely make the type and number of Transatlantic passages that Cheeky Rafiki had done. 

Given the nature of the 40.7 and it's hard use and abuse and advancing age, in my opinion the owner should have insisted on a detailed structural survey before a passage across the Atlantic. Had that been done, there is a good chance that the delivery crew would be here today. 

Jeff


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## Guyfromthenorth

Jeff_H said:


> There is nothing normal about the Cheeky Rafiki story. This was not your average production boat, your average delivery or average delivery crew.
> 
> The Beneteau 40.7's were serious racer-cruisers with a real emphasis on racer rather than cruisers. They were more tightly engineered than most production boats, and went through way higher quality controls than most production or even semi-custom boats.
> 
> Cheeky Rafiki had a hard life. She was raced very hard including in some very tough conditions. She had made multiple trans Atlantic passages. She had an exceptional number of groundings including several that were termed hard groundings. If I remember correctly, she had some damage noted and thought to have been repaired in a manner inconsistent with the surveyor recommendations. And given the location of the damage, in the unlikely case that the delivery crew might have seen those repairs, they would not have any way to know whether they were done properly.
> 
> And lastly what ever else you think about production boats, 40.7s were designed to be able to do offshore races and passages, but my belief is that they were never intended to routinely make the type and number of Transatlantic passages that Cheeky Rafiki had done.
> 
> Given the nature of the 40.7 and it's hard use and abuse and advancing age, in my opinion the owner should have insisted on a detailed structural survey before a passage across the Atlantic. Had that been done, there is a good chance that the delivery crew would be here today.
> 
> Jeff


Good points Jeff, I agree with it but also with Capta as well. In my line of work where high hazard is part of the job we are taught 2 big things that relate to this topic.

1) You can't delegate responsibility: This means that the onsite supervisor with boots on the ground is responsible for their own, and their crews safety. Maybe the Captain did ask about the boats seaworthiness and maybe he was mislead? Maybe he didn't ask and probably should have before leaving the coast behind.

2) A supervisor is responsible for the safety of their staff, and must identify a hazard immediately upon noticing it: Just because you aren't on the scene (owner) doesn't mean you can let someone else take responsibility of an unsafe piece of equipment. If he knew it was not up to snuff or would not sail it himself he should not have let them leave in the first place. On top of that, if the above statement was true, and he received a concerning call from the crew and did not immediately report that he is again at fault.

It's unfortunate when anyone loses their life to what most likely was a preventable failure, but I think both supervisors (owner and captain) share a certain amount of responsibility here. Just my thoughts from the sidelines and only knowing a bit of the story.


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## albrazzi

Guyfromthenorth said:


> Good points Jeff, I agree with it but also with Capta as well. In my line of work where high hazard is part of the job we are taught 2 big things that relate to this topic.
> 
> 1) You can't delegate responsibility: This means that the onsite supervisor with boots on the ground is responsible for their own, and their crews safety. Maybe the Captain did ask about the boats seaworthiness and maybe he was mislead? Maybe he didn't ask and probably should have before leaving the coast behind.
> 
> 2) A supervisor is responsible for the safety of their staff, and must identify a hazard immediately upon noticing it: Just because you aren't on the scene (owner) doesn't mean you can let someone else take responsibility of an unsafe piece of equipment. If he knew it was not up to snuff or would not sail it himself he should not have let them leave in the first place. On top of that, if the above statement was true, and he received a concerning call from the crew and did not immediately report that he is again at fault.
> 
> It's unfortunate when anyone loses their life to what most likely was a preventable failure, but I think both supervisors (owner and captain) share a certain amount of responsibility here. Just my thoughts from the sidelines and only knowing a bit of the story.


Your boots on the ground theory doesn't hold if there is a "Known" hazard by management and work continues. "Known" being the key here if the damage was known and or occurred only while the current crew was on board and no one else "Knew" then its all on the current crew. Sadly the crew didn't make it so their responsibility is not an issue. Even though there were clear indications of damage.


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## Guyfromthenorth

albrazzi said:


> Your boots on the ground theory doesn't hold if there is a "Known" hazard by management and work continues. "Known" being the key here if the damage was known and or occurred only while the current crew was on board and no one else "Knew" then its all on the current crew. Sadly the crew didn't make it so their responsibility is not an issue. Even though there were clear indications of damage.


As someone who works in very remote locations with high levels of risk I can say that when I transition into those spots I ask for hazards, history, and what may have happened that could come back to be an issue. If I were to sail on a boat across an ocean I certainly would ask the same questions to see what answers I get. If management looks you in the eye and says she's got no problems and I'll see you on the other side, well that's certainly a problem.

I'm not trying to blame anyone who is no longer with us, but I guess I'm just trying to see the "lessons learned" here based on assumptions. I think it's good practice for anyone who is taking over a ship, or job, they haven't know intimately to ask the pertinent questions and not just assume all is well. Unless of course there is evidence the captain asked the owner if there are any boat issues and the owner told him it's good to go. Just saying both sides of the fence have duties to safety...


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## albrazzi

North, Not challenging you if it sounds that way, Of course I agree completely and Maritime law is written such that all parties are partially responsible unlike land laws where under some circumstances you might not carry a responsibility in your actions. I think we share the same OSHA background and I only say that were these guys able to survive this failure they (might) be held partially responsible had they asked the right questions, Ignored the answer, and failed to inspect the Boat. I probably didn't study this situation as well as I could have for this conversation but it sounds like the Owner knew a whole lot more than the Crew. There definitely would have been a Captains responsibility to his crew at issue here no matter what but unfortunately this falls entirely on the owner.


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## Guyfromthenorth

albrazzi said:


> North, Not challenging you if it sounds that way, Of course I agree completely and Maritime law is written such that all parties are partially responsible unlike land laws where under some circumstances you might not carry a responsibility in your actions. I think we share the same OSHA background and I only say that were these guys able to survive this failure they (might) be held partially responsible had they asked the right questions, Ignored the answer, and failed to inspect the Boat. I probably didn't study this situation as well as I could have for this conversation but it sounds like the Owner knew a whole lot more than the Crew. There definitely would have been a Captains responsibility to his crew at issue here no matter what but unfortunately this falls entirely on the owner.


I agree Albrazzi, I think that's the hard part for fatal incidents, we often don't get to find out the whole story but we do try our best to get what we can and avoid it in the future.


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## krisscross

The article says that Cheeki left for England with some keel bolts missing. Really? If that is true, negligence is beyond 'likely' in this case. Not sure who knew about it - not stated in the article - but if it was the company boss, that dude is guilty as sin.


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## dmdelorme

I agree fully as i also have worked in remote and dangerous locations. you are responsible your life and your crew.. But some times management pushes hard. it take experience on how to deal with the pressure and how to say no when the risk is too high. Never take anyones word if it is your life. i per-inspect all rigging as i have many times found serious errors.. I had other workers criticize and tease me but they weren't the ones hanging of the swing stage or other stuff. It is a shame so many young people died. I hope the management and company face the full force of the law.

Canada passed very tough laws after a major coal mine accident was linked to poor management.


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## eherlihy

So have any of the delivery skippers here ever reported to pick up a boat and then refused to get underway because of the condition of the vessel? the problem is that the skipper is usually "on the hook," having arranged for their transportation to and from the vessel, not to mention any pressure from the vessel's owner. I know that this has not happened to me, although I have only done a few deliveries.


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## capta

eherlihy said:


> So have any of the delivery skippers here ever reported to pick up a boat and then refused to get underway because of the condition of the vessel? the problem is that the skipper is usually "on the hook," having arranged for their transportation to and from the vessel, not to mention any pressure from the vessel's owner. I know that this has not happened to me, although I have only done a few deliveries.


I can't remember ever having walked away from a delivery, and I've delivered quite a few boats I wish I hadn't, especially when I was head down in some compartment, making repairs at sea. But most of the crappy boats I delivered were bareboats at the end of their 5 year contract, going from the VI to Lauderdale, and I knew they were crappy boats before I ever saw them. 
As long as you don't hit a front or a tropical storm (both fairly rare in June/early July back then, anyway), that's pretty much a milk run (almost as easy as California to Hawaii), so we got away with it most of the time. However that run, though in the ocean most of the voyage, is hardly 'deep sea' if you run close to the eastern reefs of the Bahamas, so land and safety weren't far off, if needed. 
Most of my other deliveries came through brokers or people I trusted, so there weren't often any problems with those.
Once, I flew all the way to London before I found out that the owner expected me to take the vessel from the shipyard in Sweden without him paying the bill. But as had I gotten there on his nickle, I just had a great summer sailing in the Med and returned to the Caribbean on a delivery that fall.


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## MarkofSeaLife

The skipper was 22 years old.



22


22


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## capta

MarkofSeaLife said:


> The skipper was 22 years old. 22 22


Oh come on now Mark.
By the time I was 22 I had fished the west coast from Mexico to Alaska off and on for four years, including a season of king crab in AK, sailed to Hawaii and back twice, as well as I don't remember how many trips up and down the west coast on sailing vessels. I also had 9 round trips across the Pacific on ships, to the Orient from Hawaii or SF. Never mind racing on the Bay for 7 seasons (two per year), when I was in town. At 23, I set sail from SF on a circumnavigation on my own 49' Phil Rhodes cutter.
Age is not the criteria one should judge others' experience by.


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## boatpoker

eherlihy said:


> So have any of the delivery skippers here ever reported to pick up a boat and then refused to get underway because of the condition of the vessel? the problem is that the skipper is usually "on the hook," having arranged for their transportation to and from the vessel, not to mention any pressure from the vessel's owner. I know that this has not happened to me, although I have only done a few deliveries.


As you may know, Sharon and I deliver only power boats (they pay much better  ). Part of my contract states that we are paid for 1/2 to one full day to inspect and familiarize ourselves with the vessel before casting off.

We have once refused to take a vessel and flew home. We have once refused to take a vessel and were put up in a hotel for four days while repairs were made.

If the captain took Rafiki out without noticing missing keel bolts then he belongs on the same gallows as Innes.


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## Jeff_H

krisscross said:


> The article says that Cheeki left for England with some keel bolts missing. Really? If that is true, negligence is beyond 'likely' in this case. Not sure who knew about it - not stated in the article - but if it was the company boss, that dude is guilty as sin.


I do not think that is correct. My understanding from reading the report was that Farr's office specified the thickness and laminate in the keel area as well as the bolting pattern for the keel. At some point Beneteau re-engineered this area of the boat so that there were fewer but larger bolts and a different laminate schedule. Because of that, early on it was reported that Cheeki had fewer bolts than was originally specified. My recollection is that Cheeki had the revised Beneteau design, and that it was concluded that the revised design met the required structural standards. It was also noted that there was a thickness tolerance for the laminate and that Cheeki was close to the bottom of that tolerance.

The pictures of Cheeki's bottom suggested that the failure was a laminate failure, which would have been very difficult for a crew to detect with a boat in the water.

I think that good delivery skippers typically do inspect a boat and will either insist on repairs being made when they are dangerous to safe operations or else walk away. I was asked to do a delivery of a boat that was delayed nearly a month between the needed repairs and then waiting for a weather window.

Jeff


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## outbound

Jeff even owners do the same. Just good seamanship and of course they have even more skin in the game -their money and their life.


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## knuterikt

outbound said:


> Jeff even owners do the same. Just good seamanship and of course they have even more skin in the game -their money and their life.


The difference is that as a owner&skipper you hopefully know the history with groundings and other abuse.


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## jeremiahbltz2

Having followed this case from the beginning, there's a lot of nuance here that (shock) some posters are not recognizing. The keel attachment structure on these boats is widely reported to be almost impossible to inspect (IIRC you have to remove the saloon table to even get a halfway good look), and also poorly engineered and underbuilt. Add to this that there were apparently a number of un or underreported groundings, and you've got a situation where there's a lot of blame to go around. My take is that it's mainly between Beneteau (for building a vessel that's nearly impossible to keep safe) and Innes, but that Innes will take all the heat.


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## outbound

Good point but owners still go through the whole boat including checking the rig, all through hulls, pumps, checking all fasteners, lines for chafe, inspection dates on safety equipment etc. before a passage. In short everyone has a long check list they go through for passage unlike what you do for a daysail. Yes, you do most of it as you prep the boat but there’s still a check list.
BTW I don’t know everything that happens while I’m asleep unless told. Not everyone tells you. Still inspect everything.


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## Jeff_H

jeremiahbltz2 said:


> Having followed this case from the beginning, there's a lot of nuance here that (shock) some posters are not recognizing. The keel attachment structure on these boats is widely reported to be almost impossible to inspect (IIRC you have to remove the saloon table to even get a halfway good look), and also poorly engineered and underbuilt. Add to this that there were apparently a number of un or underreported groundings, and you've got a situation where there's a lot of blame to go around. My take is that it's mainly between Beneteau (for building a vessel that's nearly impossible to keep safe) and Innes, but that Innes will take all the heat.


With all due respect, I suggest that you are mistaken in some of your statements and may be thinking of a different vessel. Having spent a lot of time on these boats, your description of the inaccessibility of the keel bolts is in error. In fact, the transverse frames, ends of the keel bolts, backing plates and nuts are very readily available for inspection on the Beneteau 40.7.

You are correct that the keel bolts are largely located below the table. But there are three hatches on the centerline of the the boat which are all very quick and easy to remove. Simply by lifting them up there is excellent visible access to the bolts. The hatches are arranged so that they start and stop at the table legs and although the leaves of the table needs to be in the up position to be able to tilt the middle hatch entirely out of the way, the bolts are fully visible even with the hatch partly in place as shown in the two photos below showing the middle hatch partially and fully out of the way.

[/IMG]
http://newimages.yachtworld.com/res...8448_1_XLARGE.jpg&w=924&h=693&t=1373958828000








[/URL][/IMG]

http://newimages.yachtworld.com/res...2755_7_XLARGE.jpg&w=924&h=693&t=1314682076000

Even so, removing the table is no big deal either. The table sits on stainless steel legs, is pretty light and it is easy to simply lift the legs out of sockets which are bolted to the transverse frames. You can see the sockets in the photos as well.

The report also contradicts your statement that said, _ "The keel attachment structure on these boats is ............ also poorly engineered and underbuilt."_

On the contrary the report indicated that the structural design and execution were well within the standards of the CE rating Directive for Recreational Watercraft, ABS, and OSR's. The report noted that an exceptional level of quality control inspections were performed on all of the 40.7's and that Beneteau had maintained comprehensive records on that quality control procedure for each of the 40.7's. Those inspections included measuring the thickness of the hull at the bolt holes and keeping on file the coupons (which were drilled out to create the bolt holes) for every 40.7 which is how they knew that Cheeki was at the lower range of the allowable thickness tolerance.

The appendix to the report actually reviewed Beneteau's re-engineered design and included a reverse engineering of the laminate based on the laminate and thickness found in the coupons from Cheeki. The conclusion did not show that there was an issue either with the engineering or with the as-built condition.

Respectfully,
Jeff


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## outbound

Jeff don’t want to pick on Bene. Rather ask you from a N.A. point of view isn’t this an inherent difficulty with high aspect fin keel boats when there’s no keel stub to diffuse acute loading from impact? Particularly when the canoe body is called on to assume part of or the major part of the loading. Sure normal loading will be transferred to the frames but severe acute loading from a grounding will be upwards at the aft portion of the junction between keel and canoe body. A direction not normally seen. Do you folks put that possibility in to your thinking when designing a boat? Does CE?


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## Jeff_H

outbound said:


> Jeff don't want to pick on Bene. Rather ask you from a N.A. point of view isn't this an inherent difficulty with high aspect fin keel boats when there's no keel stub to diffuse acute loading from impact? Particularly when the canoe body is called on to assume part of or the major part of the loading. Sure normal loading will be transferred to the frames but severe acute loading from a grounding will be upwards at the aft portion of the junction between keel and canoe body. A direction not normally seen. Do you folks put that possibility in to your thinking when designing a boat? Does CE?


In reality the keel stub (or the top of an encapsulated keel ) makes it worse rather than better. What happens in a design like the 40.7 is that the loads are being transferred directly into a framing system that disburses the loads around the boat through longitudinal and transverse framing. By design the skin normally would not experience the force of the grounding other than acting as the bottom chord of a beam in very limited locations.

When you have a keel stub or an encapsulated keel, the top of the stub or encapsulation tries to sheer vertically through the hull skin. As a result you need much stiffer transverse structure at that juncture and almost by definition this is where any transverse framing would be reduced in depth further concentrating the load due to the relative stiffness between the deeper sections over the bilge vs over the skin.

Jeff


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## outbound

Makes sense except don’t fully grasp why there be a reduction in depth of the transverse framing. 
At present there’s a 60+ft-er who ran aground at hull speed into rock. They took off the external pb keel to look for damage to the stub. There’s a horizontal crack on one side of about a foot nearly amidships. Yard crew said can be repaired to “as good as new” but if there was no stub boat would be a total loss. Pb has a deep dent at leading bottom edge on opposite side from crack. 
Have seen multiple boats where keel is pushed into the boat at aft junction between keel and canoe body with yard saying total loss.
?.?.? Why would stronger set up fail? Or is it harder to repair?


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## Jeff_H

I have no idea what the story is on the 60 footer and why the yard would have made the statement that they did. It may be something about the design of that boat, but its not universally true. Nor is it true that a boat with a keel stub or an encapsulated keel is inherently stronger. 

But to explain, on any design, whether with or with out a sump of some kind, the transverse frames are limited in vertical depth between the cabin sole and canoe body. The actual depth being chosen by the engineer and designer. Without a sump, the transverse frame can be a consistently tapering beam (deeper at the centerline and shallower as the beam approaches the longitudinal framing and flats) without any stress risers. Without a sump or encapsulation the width of the contact of the keel, is not restricted in width so can be spread out over a wider area, and being directly in contact with the beams, is a stronger simpler connection. 

In the case of a boat with a keel stub or encapsulation, there is a vertical distance between the bottom of the transverse frame (if there even is transverse framing since many boats with keel stubs or encapsulation totally lack framing) and the moment concentration at the top of the ballast. In a properly engineered boat, the bottom if the transverse frame extends down to the top of the ballast and rolls out into the bilge so that the ballast can be bolted directly to the frame. This creates a stress riser where the shallow portion of the frame at the canoe body meets the stiffer portion of the frame that extends into the sump. That is typically where transverse frames fail in framed boats with encapsulated keels or sumps, and a failure at that juncture is almost impossible to repair since there is not enough real estate to make a sturdy connection. 

This problem is aggravated by the stiffness of the stub/ encapsulation. The skin of the stub/ encapsulation is perpendicular to the canoe body and so in a grounding tries to shear through the skin of the canoe body and transverse framing. It is this stress concentration and sheering that makes the likelihood of a serious failure more likely when all else is equal. 

This discussion often gets distorted because rarely is all else equal. What normally happens in these discussions is a comparison of keels that are extremely short fore and aft to keels that have a larger contact patch on the hull. Obviously there is more area to spread out the load and so the unit forces are less on a keel with a longer keel root. But that is a different problem from the issue of a boat with a keel stub or encapsulation, vs a keel bolted directly below the canoe body. 

The strongest keel connections for these short keel roots are a 'cassette' connection, but those are rarely used. and almost never used on production boats. 

Jeff


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## jeremiahbltz2

I'll of course defer to you on this, Jeff, but my understanding (of the best understanding we have) was that, when the vessel left Antigua, the keel bolts were fine. What was not fine was the keel support grid, which had come delaminated from the hull. This is the part that I thought was hard to inspect and (especially given the difficulty of inspection) underbuilt. When it came loose from the hull, it allowed the keel to wiggle back and forth, straining and hardening the bolts, and enlarging the bolt holes. After a few hundred miles the bolts just ripped through the grid and skin.

If this is true (and I could totally be wrong), then the design defect is that the weakest part of the keel-hull connection (the grid attachment to the hull) is also the hardest to inspect and repair. Not a problem with keel grids in general, but a problem with this one. I recall several stories of the grid on these boats becoming detached after grounding. I just re-read some bits of the report, and apparently in order to properly inspect the matrix bonding, you not only have to pull our the entire floor, but also drop the keel. Not a good design for the weakest link in a system.

What happened to Cheeki Rafiki? Key findings from the official Marine Accident Investigation Branch report - Page 2 of 3 - Yachting World


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## outbound

Jeff what’s a cassette connection?


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## -OvO-

capta said:


> By the time I was 22 ...


Fair point, but had you stood up and faced down a wealthy owner twice your age? Not all life skills are technical ones, and some of those judgement skills come late.


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## Jeff_H

outbound said:


> Jeff what's a cassette connection?


The best way to describe a cassette connection is to visualize a short daggerboard trunk that the top of the keel is inserted into. The trunk is typically heavily reinforced with transverse and longitudinal framing. The keel is typically bolted in both horizontally and vertically. The design of the cassette (trunk and keel end) is such that there is a lot of contact area and leverage to the connection between the keel and the boat. Some cassette connection also are designed with an impact absorbing connection minimizing the likelihood of damage to the boat in a grounding or collision.

Jeff


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## knuterikt

Jeff_H said:


> The best way to describe a cassette connection is to visualize a short daggerboard trunk that the top of the keel is inserted into. The trunk is typically heavily reinforced with transverse and longitudinal framing. The keel is typically bolted in both horizontally and vertically. The design of the cassette (trunk and keel end) is such that there is a lot of contact area and leverage to the connection between the keel and the boat. Some cassette connection also are designed with an impact absorbing connection minimizing the likelihood of damage to the boat in a grounding or collision.
> 
> Jeff


This Swedish yard has taken the cassette design one step further. The keel on this boat has adjustable depth, draft is adjustable between 1.90 and 2.45 meters. The video is from a crash test performed, top cover removed.


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## gonecrusin

Jeff_H said:


> With all due respect, I suggest that you are mistaken in some of your statements and may be thinking of a different vessel. Having spent a lot of time on these boats, your description of the inaccessibility of the keel bolts is in error. In fact, the transverse frames, ends of the keel bolts, backing plates and nuts are very readily available for inspection on the Beneteau 40.7.
> 
> You are correct that the keel bolts are largely located below the table. But there are three hatches on the centerline of the the boat which are all very quick and easy to remove. Simply by lifting them up there is excellent visible access to the bolts. The hatches are arranged so that they start and stop at the table legs and although the leaves of the table needs to be in the up position to be able to tilt the middle hatch entirely out of the way, the bolts are fully visible even with the hatch partly in place as shown in the two photos below showing the middle hatch partially and fully out of the way.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> [/URL][/IMG]
> 
> http://newimages.yachtworld.com/res...8448_1_XLARGE.jpg&w=924&h=693&t=1373958828000
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> [/URL][/IMG]
> 
> http://newimages.yachtworld.com/res...2755_7_XLARGE.jpg&w=924&h=693&t=1314682076000
> 
> Even so, removing the table is no big deal either. The table sits on stainless steel legs, is pretty light and it is easy to simply lift the legs out of sockets which are bolted to the transverse frames. You can see the sockets in the photos as well.
> 
> The report also contradicts your statement that said, _ "The keel attachment structure on these boats is ............ also poorly engineered and underbuilt."_
> 
> On the contrary the report indicated that the structural design and execution were well within the standards of the CE rating Directive for Recreational Watercraft, ABS, and OSR's. The report noted that an exceptional level of quality control inspections were performed on all of the 40.7's and that Beneteau had maintained comprehensive records on that quality control procedure for each of the 40.7's. Those inspections included measuring the thickness of the hull at the bolt holes and keeping on file the coupons (which were drilled out to create the bolt holes) for every 40.7 which is how they knew that Cheeki was at the lower range of the allowable thickness tolerance.
> 
> The appendix to the report actually reviewed Beneteau's re-engineered design and included a reverse engineering of the laminate based on the laminate and thickness found in the coupons from Cheeki. The conclusion did not show that there was an issue either with the engineering or with the as-built condition.
> 
> Respectfully,
> Jeff


The problems is not with the keel connection to the hull but the inner pan breaking free from the hull. When this happens the hull/keel connection flexes and fails. Inspecting the bonding of inner pan to the hull is difficult, repairing any inner pan to hull failures is very very difficult. Of the 40.7's that grounded at speed that I know of, Beneteau recommended scrapping the boat. Pan boats are very economical to build but are tough to inspect and repair.


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## Yorksailor

gonecrusin said:


> The problems is not with the keel connection to the hull but the inner pan breaking free from the hull. When this happens the hull/keel connection flexes and fails. Inspecting the bonding of inner pan to the hull is difficult, repairing any inner pan to hull failures is very very difficult. Of the 40.7's that grounded at speed that I know of, Beneteau recommended scrapping the boat. Pan boats are very economical to build but are tough to inspect and repair.


Which is why I cruise on a boat with a heavy encapsulated keel.

Phil.


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## Jeff_H

gonecrusin said:


> The problems is not with the keel connection to the hull but the inner pan breaking free from the hull. When this happens the hull/keel connection flexes and fails. Inspecting the bonding of inner pan to the hull is difficult, repairing any inner pan to hull failures is very very difficult. Of the 40.7's that grounded at speed that I know of, Beneteau recommended scrapping the boat. Pan boats are very economical to build but are tough to inspect and repair.


A couple quick points here,

Separation of the pan from the hull or horizontal sheer in the hull is a serious problem on any boat with pan construction. It is actually a bigger problem on boats with encapsulated keels since you can't get to the canoe body laminate as easily. But fortunately on a boat with a bolt on keel, that sort of damage is repairable and it is pretty easily detectable with the boat out of the water by tapping out the connections in the bilge and around the keel area for sounds of delamination.

I have no idea what would have caused Beneteau to recommend scrapping the 40.7 that you mention, (an $80,000 to $150,000 boat) but assuming that pan/canoe body delamination is the only damage, proper repairs can be performed for something like 10 to 20% of the value of the boat.

The way that this repair is done on a bolt on keel is that the keel is removed and the side of the frames and the frame (pan) turn out onto the bilge is cut away. The top of the frames are ground as well. If the canoe body is delaminated due to horizontal sheer, the boat needs to be supported so that the hull shape is not distorted, and then the hull is ground down from below the boat until solid glass is found. Glass and epoxy are then laminated from the outside of the boat using the remainder of the laminate as a male mold and vacuum bagging to get a dense laminate.

Then glass and epoxy (or vinylester) resin are laminated over the tops of the frames and into the bilge area using the remnants of the frames and hull as the mold. The bilge can be painted and then the bolt holes bored and the keel reattached.

When you are done, you have what is essentially an epoxy cloth sandwich with a polyester core. Properly done it would actually be stronger than originally constructed and would not add much weight to the boat. (This was done to a Laser 28 back in the early 1990's and the owner claimed that it added between 10 and 20 lbs to the weight of the boat. (I am skeptical that the weight could be determined that accurately with the technology of the day).

The 40.7 is an especially good candidate for this kind of repair since the cabin sole is easily removable exposing the entire pan and framing.

It should be noted that on a similar grounding on an encapsulated keel boat, this is a much harder, if not impossible repair since the delamination occurs over a very broad area of the boat. often concertrated where the encapsulation envelope meets the hull and in a portion of the hull that would be very difficult to fair properly given the curvature of the hull at this point. But the bigger problem that typically occurs with an encapsulated keel in a hard grounding is that the bond between the ballast and the encapsulation envelope is typically broken. Since that bond is a key structural component, this loss of bonding is almost impossible to reestablish, Once lost, the strength the keel is greatly reduced allowing much greater flexural loads to be imparted at the top of the ballast, and at the turn in the hull from the bilge to to the canoe body which then further increases fatigue rates and reduces strength at this location.

Jeff


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## outbound

Jeff read your posts with interest and respect but still would contend “it depends “ should be the operative position in this discussion. Have personally seen to many bolt on keels(not just ballast) where the aft end of the keel has been driven into the canoe body as result on a hard grounding to be sanguine that that design element is universally good unless appropriately executed. Keels made of iron with either Pb or Fe ballast at the end. Similarly you caused me to take a flashlight and examine my keel and bilges in detail when we recently went down to check the boat to see if wind/solar was keeping up with parasitic losses.
Our chord is moderate not particularly high aspect. Bulb is two lead halves then horizontally through bolted to keel and heavily glassed over. Inner portion of keel filled with lead then glassed over leaving a bilge but glass extending along inner surface of canoe body. Top surface of bilge seems to be epoxy without fiber. Hull and keel is solid glass from a single mold. Stringers occur repetitively across top of keel region and extend down to ~1/5 of keel bonded to top of lead. It would appear in a grounding forces would be communicated to stringers and frames in the majority not to canoe skin. Stringers at rear and forward ends of where keel joins canoe body seem particularly robust. I’ve not heard of any of the 63 sisterships having issues after a grounding and assume groundings are not if but when events. So continue to believe “it depends “ holds true.
Similarly I have experience of early glass boats which in many respects were close derivatives of wood construction mind set design. Some with mixed internal/external ballast, some bolt on to classic (Hess/Atkins) full keels, some internal to modified full keel of Perry design. Again I don’t recall any particular issue with groundings. In short continue to believe it’s not nature of appendage that increases risk with hard grounding but rather execution in design and construction. I continue to believe metal bolt on high aspect keels in pan built boats present a particularly hard design element. Look at an Xyacht or Jboat v a less expensive production boat. Too my uneducated eye would be more comfortable cruising Maine where this feature was well thought out with the eventuality of a grounding occurring than some recent designs. Respectfully suggest your statements are a bit too categorical not allowing for the genius of some NAs.


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## Lazerbrains

Jeff_H said:


> Separation of the pan from the hull or horizontal sheer in the hull is a serious problem on any boat with pan construction. It is actually a bigger problem on boats with encapsulated keels since you can't get to the canoe body laminate as easily. Jeff


This is a curious statement - I'm not aware of any encsapsulated keels with pan construction. Which boats are built this way?


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## Jeff_H

Lazerbrains said:


> This is a curious statement - I'm not aware of any encsapsulated keels with pan construction. Which boats are built this way?


I don't think that is all that uncommon. Off hand a few examples might be boats like th,e Ray Hunt designed Odays, and Rangers, some of the 1980's era Pearson's and Bristol's, some of the later Morgan's, Pacific Seacraft, Island Packets, Contests, some of the bigger Moody's.

Jeff


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## seabeau

Yorksailor said:


> Which is why I cruise on a boat with a heavy encapsulated keel.
> 
> Phil.


Which is why I cruise on a boat with no fixed keel at all.


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## gonecrusin

Jeff_H said:


> A couple quick points here,
> 
> Separation of the pan from the hull or horizontal sheer in the hull is a serious problem on any boat with pan construction. It is actually a bigger problem on boats with encapsulated keels since you can't get to the canoe body laminate as easily. But fortunately on a boat with a bolt on keel, that sort of damage is repairable and it is pretty easily detectable with the boat out of the water by tapping out the connections in the bilge and around the keel area for sounds of delamination.
> 
> I have no idea what would have caused Beneteau to recommend scrapping the 40.7 that you mention, (an $80,000 to $150,000 boat) but assuming that pan/canoe body delamination is the only damage, proper repairs can be performed for something like 10 to 20% of the value of the boat.
> 
> The way that this repair is done on a bolt on keel is that the keel is removed and the side of the frames and the frame (pan) turn out onto the bilge is cut away. The top of the frames are ground as well. If the canoe body is delaminated due to horizontal sheer, the boat needs to be supported so that the hull shape is not distorted, and then the hull is ground down from below the boat until solid glass is found. Glass and epoxy are then laminated from the outside of the boat using the remainder of the laminate as a male mold and vacuum bagging to get a dense laminate.
> 
> Then glass and epoxy (or vinylester) resin are laminated over the tops of the frames and into the bilge area using the remnants of the frames and hull as the mold. The bilge can be painted and then the bolt holes bored and the keel reattached.
> 
> When you are done, you have what is essentially an epoxy cloth sandwich with a polyester core. Properly done it would actually be stronger than originally constructed and would not add much weight to the boat. (This was done to a Laser 28 back in the early 1990's and the owner claimed that it added between 10 and 20 lbs to the weight of the boat. (I am skeptical that the weight could be determined that accurately with the technology of the day).
> 
> The 40.7 is an especially good candidate for this kind of repair since the cabin sole is easily removable exposing the entire pan and framing.
> 
> It should be noted that on a similar grounding on an encapsulated keel boat, this is a much harder, if not impossible repair since the delamination occurs over a very broad area of the boat. often concertrated where the encapsulation envelope meets the hull and in a portion of the hull that would be very difficult to fair properly given the curvature of the hull at this point. But the bigger problem that typically occurs with an encapsulated keel in a hard grounding is that the bond between the ballast and the encapsulation envelope is typically broken. Since that bond is a key structural component, this loss of bonding is almost impossible to reestablish, Once lost, the strength the keel is greatly reduced allowing much greater flexural loads to be imparted at the top of the ballast, and at the turn in the hull from the bilge to to the canoe body which then further increases fatigue rates and reduces strength at this location.
> 
> Jeff


One of the .7's I reference was repaired in the fashion you outline, it wasn't simple or cheap. I think Beneteau said scrap it because there are not many shops around that are skilled or capable of doing this type of repair economically. The boat is again sailing and it is undoubtedly a better boat but since it was considered "scrap" by the builder I'm not sure it's insurable.

Personally, I believe there are lot's of pan boats sailing today with some amount of de-bonding between the hull and the pan and we will see more failures as time goes along. Don't get me wrong, I've owned pan boats and would own them again but they are somewhat of a ticking time bomb and it's important to "listen" to what the boat is telling you. Unfortunately there really isn't a good way to check a boat for hull/pan bonding failure, they've tried thermal radiography and ultrasonic with limited success, even tapping with a hammer is not conclusive (are you tapping where you're supposed to tap).

At the end of the day, it is what it is, mostly good, sometimes bad but rarely disastrous.


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## boatpoker

gonecrusin said:


> The problems is not with the keel connection to the hull but the inner pan breaking free from the hull. When this happens the hull/keel connection flexes and fails. Inspecting the bonding of inner pan to the hull is difficult, repairing any inner pan to hull failures is very very difficult. Of the 40.7's that grounded at speed that I know of, Beneteau recommended scrapping the boat. Pan boats are very economical to build but are tough to inspect and repair.


Ensuring that the pan was ever bonded to the hull in the first place is problematic with this type of construction. I have one example on my website .... Liner Bonding Failure


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## Jeff_H

boatpoker said:


> Ensuring that the pan was ever bonded to the hull in the first place is problematic with this type of construction. I have one example on my website .... Liner Bonding Failure


I agree that there is a real possibility that the boat can leave the factory without the pan being properly adhered to the hull. This is precisely the reason that I strongly recommend that new boat buyers get a thorough survey of their new boat before acceptance of the boat.

Your report also points out my concerns about boats with full pans rather than a molded framing system. At least on boats with molded framing systems the bond and the flanges against the hull are visible.

One of my biggest concerns about boats being built over the past 20 years is the more extensive use of adhesives rather than tabbing to connect structural elements. There was a time when the manufacturers tabbed everything into place. By the late 1990's there was a major shift to simply gluing things. The problem in my mind is not with the glue itself, but with the smaller areas to which the glues were being applied. So while early pan boats typically had wide areas of thickened polyester between the pans and the hull, somewhere in the mid-1990's manufacturers began putting down narrow strips of higher strength adhesives at strategic locations such as the edge of the frames where they contact the hulls-leaving large portions of the pan un-bonded. Compounding this is that verticals and flats are also only glued or screwed to the pans so that they no longer act as reliable structural components, and that the pans need to deal with much higher load transfers between the bulkheads, and flats and the skin.

It is also made worse by the way that rigging loads are transmitted through compression posts below the mast and tension rods that place highly concentrated loads into the pan.

But the issue with installing pans with these narrow, glued, contact areas go beyond the structural. The void behind the pans allows mold to be able to build up. Water is able to flow behind the pan and carry whatever happens to be in the water into the voids so that its not unusual have horrible odor problems aboard an older boat with this construction.

Jeff


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## sailingfool

boatpoker said:


> Ensuring that the pan was ever bonded to the hull in the first place is problematic with this type of construction. I have one example on my website .... Liner Bonding Failure


Very interesting situation, any chance you can offer the name of the builder in question, even if in anagram form?


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## boatpoker

sailingfool said:


> Very interesting situation, any chance you can offer the name of the builder in question, even if in anagram form?


Sorry no. I've been in court before


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## capta

-OvO- said:


> Fair point, but had you stood up and faced down a wealthy owner twice your age? Not all life skills are technical ones, and some of those judgement skills come late.


Let me put it this way. Had I "stood up and faced down a wealthy owner twice your age" by 22, no. But I have no doubt that most of the captains I worked for as a teen on the commercial fishing boats, would beat out a wealthy owner twice my age for sheer orneriness and just plain meanness, 10 times over.
At least that's my experience since those days, with wealthy owners.


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## Thomas Davis Harrell

Boats on the seas today have many construction materials fiberglass, aluminum, concrete, wood, steel and even more construction methods for those materials hand laid FG, injection molded plastic, tab FG, pan FG, cold molded wood, lap wood, klinker, plywood, stitch and glue, to put them together. The architect, builder, purveyor, outfitter, rigger, engineer, mates, and captain all have a role in getting a ship to sea. But in my mind the person that is directly responsible for ship setting sail is the captain. If we go back to the examine the sinking of the Titanic we can question substandard steel with its high sulfur content. We can question the builder for the rivets, and the architect for bulkheads that did not go completely to the deck and watchman for not seeing the ice. In the end it was the captain that set out with the ship as it was, chose the more dangerous faster route and held the ships speed into the ice. This matter is no different. Captains bear the responsibility for ship, crew and passengers. That is why they are given the authority to tell the owner or the purveyor or the outfitter no. I will not captain the boat. This should remind us that it's not a trivial matter that we give the authority to the captain. In this matter his judgement cost him and his crew their lives. That's my 2 cents


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## troy2000

Thomas Davis Harrell said:


> Boats on the seas today have many construction materials fiberglass, aluminum, concrete, wood, steel and even more construction methods for those materials hand laid FG, injection molded plastic, tab FG, pan FG, cold molded wood, lap wood, klinker, plywood, stitch and glue, to put them together. The architect, builder, purveyor, outfitter, rigger, engineer, mates, and captain all have a role in getting a ship to sea. But in my mind the person that is directly responsible for ship setting sail is the captain. If we go back to the examine the sinking of the Titanic we can question substandard steel with its high sulfur content. We can question the builder for the rivets, and the architect for bulkheads that did not go completely to the deck and watchman for not seeing the ice. In the end it was the captain that set out with the ship as it was, chose the more dangerous faster route and held the ships speed into the ice. This matter is no different. Captains bear the responsibility for ship, crew and passengers. That is why they are given the authority to tell the owner or the purveyor or the outfitter no. I will not captain the boat. This should remind us that it's not a trivial matter that we give the authority to the captain. In this matter his judgement cost him and his crew their lives. That's my 2 cents


Of course, the pertinent question is whether the captain of Cheeki-Rafiki had access to the information he needed to properly exercise his judgment. Captains aren't psychics, and they don't have x-ray vision that enables them to find undisclosed and/or unknown structural problems... I personally wouldn't be too quick to beat up on him.


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## capta

Thomas Davis Harrell said:


> I will not captain the boat.


I'm sorry, but without trying to be rude, this is just a naive statement. To imply that the captain of the Titanic should have had any knowledge of the failings of her construction, is just silly. It is my guess the owners didn't even know. One does not reach the position of captain of a company's flagship vessel by being a prima donna. Nor does one succeed as a delivery captain or yacht master by saying "I will not captain the boat" very many times. There are dozens, if not hundreds of other skippers willing and able to take that boat to sea and take the chance. Rarely does it end as this tale has ended.
Of course, the master has the ultimate *responsibility*, but that is *not* the same thing as being at fault. Captain Hazelwood was responsible for the Exon Valdez catastrophe, but he was no way at fault. In fact, he was made the fall guy because the Valdez port authority and the US CG failed to do their jobs properly.
I've taken vessels to sea that I'm sure that many, if not most, on here wouldn't be comfortable sleeping overnight aboard, along routes I was very familiar with, in weather that should have (and did) stay within expected parameters. And I got those jobs, and all the others, because I did the jobs offered me without too much hassle for the owners or their representatives.
Of course, I have no idea what went on aboard Cheeki-Rafiki, and no one ever will. I've never found myself in a comparable situation, on that sort of boat. But to blame the captain for not finding or knowing of a design/construction flaw, is just naive. A delivery captain rarely if ever has a history of the vessel he is to deliver. Groundings, dismastings or even major structural repairs are often hidden from any but the most intensive investigation, and rarely offered to a prospective skipper.
If one wants to work in this business, one will barrel into the ice at full speed as directed by the owner, against one's better judgement, or one will not be working in the business very long. 99% of the time it works out OK. 1% of the time the result may go down in history as a horrendous catastrophe, with the captain cast as the villain.


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## boatpoker

capta said:


> If one wants to work in this business, one will barrel into the ice at full speed as directed by the owner, against one's better judgement, or one will not be working in the business very long. .


I've done hundreds of powerboat deliveries between Duluth Minnesota and Antigua so I guess I am somewhat successful. Your attitude is diametrically opposed to mine but whatever works for you.


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## capta

boatpoker said:


> I've done hundreds of powerboat deliveries between Duluth Minnesota and Antigua so I guess I am somewhat successful. Your attitude is diametrically opposed to mine but whatever works for you.


I believe the ice statement was metaphorical. I suppose I could have said, "Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead."
But seriously, are you saying that in hundreds of deliveries you have never done something, as a captain, for what seemed a good reason at the time, but in hindsight you feel you probably shouldn't have done, even though you got away with it without any problems at all?


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## boatpoker

capta said:


> I believe the ice statement was metaphorical. I suppose I could have said, "Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead."
> But seriously, are you saying that in hundreds of deliveries you have never done something, as a captain, for what seemed a good reason at the time, but in hindsight you feel you probably shouldn't have done, even though you got away with it without any problems at all?


I don't see how that vague and hypothetical question is even remotely germane to the issue at hand but hypothetically my vague answer is ... no. On my own boat yes.


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## Sal Paradise

The owner was clearly negligent, as the article stated that the boat was certified to make short trips less than 60 miles from land, unless escorted by another boat. Should the captain have known this? Should he have known of her extensive damage history and keel bolt problem? 

Its seems to me that is the specific issue he should have known about. And if he did know, he should have refused the job. It's like a pilot flying an aircraft without an airworthiness certificate. There may be no one to stop him from doing it, but it is clearly wrong. Now, how would a conscientious captain know this? 

The owner clearly knew, and didn't care. That is what he is on trial for.


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## capta

Sorry, my computer won't display this post correctly, so:
Arcb has just replied to a thread you have subscribed to entitled - Cheeki-Rafiki: Another Shoe Falls - in the Vessels Lost, Missing, or in Danger forum of SailNet Community.
"I can't imagine any professional captain not being aware of the limitations of their certificate. It seems almost impossible."
Wait a second here. Unless this boat miraculously came into existence or was shipped to the West Indies, she had to sail there from the UK, not a minor feat. And if memory serves, this was not her first voyage of some length.
So, what would prompt a crew member who had been sailing on her, then promoted to captain, to even seek out this certificate, if it was even aboard? I don't understand this line of thought. This is a whole different kettle of fish to a delivery captain arriving at the dock and stepping aboard a boat he's never seen before.


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## Sal Paradise

Capta,

Or take it one step further; Say the owner, back in the UK, receives a letter stating the certificate is now restricted to 60 miles from shore. Say he shoves it in a shoe box under his bed and tells no one. How does a captain 2000 miles away know about that?

It seems to me that these companies should have a safety manual, and everyone in the company should read and be trained in the company safety procedures. If that is in place, I see the fault would be found, as someone in the company would be reporting and tracking the repair.


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## capta

Sal Paradise said:


> Or take it one step further; Say the owner, back in the UK, receives a letter stating the certificate is now restricted to 60 miles from shore. Say he shoves it in a shoe box under his bed and tells no one. How does a captain 2000 miles away know about that?.


Exactly.
I'm curious about this "certificate". Is this a certificate to carry passengers or for the vessel itself at any time, or the captain's limitations? I don't believe I've ever seen or operated a vessel that had any sort of certificate that limited it's operations when not involved in commercial operations (I have heard that NZ has such regs [equipment related] but I've not seen them). In this case, if the crew was not paying to be aboard, and the certificate was for commercial activity, then that would mean that the certificate had no authority.
I think it is a misnomer to say that very many companies, of any type, actually care about employee welfare, if they are not being regulated by some entity. Certainly, until the Fantome incident, I'd never heard of the families of deceased crew members suing a company into bankruptcy, over a vessel and crew lost in a hurricane. No one survived to tell the tale, so the judgement was made completely on supposition and emotion. I guess it's just too damn bad for the many hundreds of others who lost their jobs and livelihoods because the company went under on account of those suppositions and emotions. 
I'm sure the same thing is in the works for the families of the lost crew of the El Faro. And now Cheeki-Rafiki. For some, money is the salve for pain and suffering, it seems. And again, I guess it's just too bad for the many hundreds of others who may lose their jobs and livelihoods, if the company is sued into nonexistence. 
We all love to blame those unable to defend themselves, and those with the deep pockets, but like the Titanic disaster, some pertinent information may not come to light for a goodly number of years, or perhaps it never will, so all we're left with is supposition and emotion. Is that really enough to castigate some and destroy the lives of others?
It's not that I have no sympathy for those who have lost loved ones. And it's not as though I wouldn't like to see us all learning from, and not repeating any mistakes, but where does the suing get us in that endeavor? 
For those of us who choose to go to sea, have we not accepted a certain amount of risk, just like those of you who get in a vehicle and commute each day? 
In this particular case, I believe this is why the discussions on these forums get so heated, when we discuss the seaworthiness of the various vessels available to us these days. We all have a fondness for what we've invested a goodly sum in, but that doesn't make any boat particularly *SEA*worthy. Emotions are not a good basis to decide matters of life and death. Or who is at fault in an incident such as this one.


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## Sal Paradise

I found this article which mentions the lack of inspection, required because it was a commercial boat.

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news...-convicted-of-failing-to-ensure-yachts-safety

"The prosecutor said: "The yacht was unsound, broken and unsafe before the four men left Antigua. The yacht had been neglected, not maintained and *importantly, because the yacht was used commercially by Mr Innes and his company, not inspected as required."*


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## albrazzi

Sal Paradise said:


> Capta,
> 
> Or take it one step further; Say the owner, back in the UK, receives a letter stating the certificate is now restricted to 60 miles from shore. Say he shoves it in a shoe box under his bed and tells no one. How does a captain 2000 miles away know about that?
> 
> It seems to me that these companies should have a safety manual, and everyone in the company should read and be trained in the company safety procedures. If that is in place, I see the fault would be found, as someone in the company would be reporting and tracking the repair.


They will have one now. And to Capta's point as along time Construction manager I will tell you our attitude towards safety is so different today then just 5-10 years ago, its just too expensive to have accidents happen. It would be nice to get to that point without litigation but unfortunately some people don't pay for things unless made to.


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